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The Depreciation of the Continental: 
A Reply 
CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS 
There are two ways to interpret Ron Michener's comment on my article. One is to 
view it as an analysis of the difficulties of estimating money demand and of identifying 
the relevant components of money supply during the colonial and Revolutionary 
periods, both of which would be necessary to draw firm conclusions about the time path 
of aggregate real money balances from 1774 through 1781. Another way to read the 
comment is as a disproof of the importance of fiscal expectations in determining the 
market value of the continental. Taking the first view, Michener's contributions and 
caveats are often well taken, though it was never my intent to estimate (or even describe 
in detail) the time path for the overall supply or demand for liquidity during this period. 
The second interpretation of his comment, which is relevant to the argument of my 
article, is not warranted by the evidence he presents. Indeed, Michener's comment 
actually provides some supporting evidence for the importance of fiscal expectations, 
and does not offer a credible alternative explanation for changes in the silver price of 
continentals. 
It is important to separate the question of the role of expectations from the question 
of "stable" money demand. In an environment of multiple media of exchange (like the 
period at issue), the question of the stability of the overall demand for money is 
essentially unrelated to the question of the determination of the rates of exchange among 
alternative monies. Michener's discussion of the aggregate real supply of money, which 
possibly includes several monies and money-like instruments, simply does not bear on 
the issue of the determination of the exchange rates among each of these instruments.' 
Michener's central claim, that available data are too poor to allow one to reject the 
quantity theory for total money balances, is simply beside the point. 
My discussion divides into three parts. First, I clarify aspects of my work, and that of 
others, which Michener misinterprets. Second, I show that Michener's evidence 
actually supports the importance of fiscal news, and that the quantity theory of 
aggregate money does not offer an alternative to my (and others') explanation for 
changes in the value of the continental. Finally, I take issue with Michener's evidence 
for real balance stability. 
QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION 
Michener seems to equate uncertain promises of future taxation with unimportant 
ones. He cites E. James Ferguson to provide evidence against the importance of fiscal 
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (Sept. 1988). (C The Economic History 
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
The author is Assistant Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201. 
1 For example, during the greenback suspension of 1862 to 1878 real money balances (whether 
narrowly or broadly defined) maintained a stable relationship with income and interest rates, but 
the exchange rate (gold value) of greenbacks and the price level fluctuated with fiscal news, while 
the aggregate nominal money supply adjusted endogenously to the price level. See Wesley C. 
Mitchell, A History of the Greenbacks (Chicago, 1903); Richard Roll, "Interest Rates and Price 
Expectations During the Civil War," this JOURNAL 32 (June 1972), pp. 476-98; Gerald R. 
Thompson, "Expectations and the Greenback Rate, 1862-1878" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Virginia, 1972); and Charles W. Calomiris, "Price and Exchange Rate Determination During the 
Greenback Suspension," Oxford Economic Papers (Dec. 1988). 
693 
694 Calomiris 
expectations for the value of the continental. Here the context, indeed the whole book, 
from which Michener draws is at odds with his argument. Ferguson's The Power of the 
Purse is, as the name suggests, a treatise precisely on the importance of fiscal backing 
for determining the value of currency and other debt. Here Ferguson follows all the 
other historians of Revolutionary finance cited in my article. When Ferguson describes 
the backing of continentals as "doubtful" he in no way is arguing that the promised 
backing was irrelevant. In fact, he is pointing to the increased doubtfulness of the 
backing as an explanation for the currency's decline. Here is the complete passage from 
which Michener draws: 
Depreciation first began in the summer or fall of 1776, in consequence not only of the volume of 
emissions, but also the military crisis. As Washington retreated and the British menaced 
Philadelphia, the faith of the thirteen states pledged to the redemption of Continental money may 
have seemed a most doubtful guarantee. The decline was registered in higher prices and the rate at 
which currency exchanged for hard money.3 
This is precisely the explanation I adopted for the initial stage of the decline in the 
currency's value. Ferguson, like every other historian of Revolutionary finance, 
emphasizes the central role of fiscal expectations in determining the currency's value. 
The novelty in my article was mainly the use of a formal model which describes two 
alternatively binding constraints on real continental balances. When expected backing is 
sufficiently high, nominal money issues act as the binding constraint; when expected 
backing is low, marginal changes in expected backing affect real balances. This is a 
useful framework for understanding the lack of any simple observed relation between 
currency emissions and the exchange rate. 
As I pointed out in my article, historians based this view on the accounts of 
contemporaries. In his letter to Francisco Rendon of March 5, 1782, Gouverneur Morris 
describes the influence of fiscal news on the value of the currency and emphasizes the 
failure of state tax backing and the Forty-for-one Act as the principle sources of bad 
news from 1780 on: 
Among all the operations of government that of taxation requires the greatest time and attention 
. But in a country like this, where the people are their own rulers, the obstacles to it are most 
insurmountable ... As taxes were not laid to fund the paper money, it soon depreciated, from that 
circumstance, and the excessive quantity which was issued to answer the exigencies of the service. 
But it is worthy of notice that this depreciation was very little accelerated or retarded by good or 
evil fortune. The losses in the campaign of 1776 did not impeach the credit or impair the value of 
the paper, and the successes which crowned the end of that and the beginning of the next year did 
not prevent a depreciation, which became sensible in the spring of 1777. This depreciation 
proceeded regularly and with increasing rapidity thro that year, and after the capture of Burgoyne 
on one hand, and the loss of Philadelphia on the other, the treaty with France was announced at 
York town in the spring 1778, the money then being at about four to one. The evacuation of 
Philadelphia and the revival of commerce in consequence of that and of the french fleet kept the 
money at about five for one, untill the autumn of that year. The depreciation still went on, but was 
arrested in its course by a hope of peace from the mediation of Spain; because it was supposed that 
in peace the value would be restored. When this hope subsided, and the temporary influence of it 
ceased, the depreciation became more rapid; and then the Congress, in order to lessen the quantity 
of money and prevent the mischiefs arising from some counterfeits, called in a considerable sum to 
be loaned. This step, which they expected would prevent depreciation, greatly increased it. The 
confidence of the people was shaken, and could not be restored. The paper went fast to ruin, and 
in the spring 1780 it was determined to call it all in, and issue new paper at a value of one for forty 
of the old, which new paper was to bear interest at five percent. This measure has given rise to so 
many different opinions and speculations both in Europe and America that it is not necessary to 
2 E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790 
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examine it at large, but one or two observations may not be amiss. The moment when former 
promises are demonstrated to be fallacious, is not the moment to make new promises. The strict 
connections between the new paper and the old injured it, because the depreciation of the old from 
forty to eighty, necessaryly brought down the new to two for one. The expectation [on the part of 
Congress] that taxes would prevent this mischief was ill founded, because the taxes were fixed in 
4 paper... 
Gouverneur Morris argues that the quantity of money issued was not by itself the 
determinant of its value; rather, the quantity issued (and expected to be issued) relative 
to expected future tax backing acted as the main influence on the value of currency. 
Michener's discussion of the Forty-for-one Act is at odds with Morris's, and my, 
discussion of the Act. Michener claims that "one would expect that continental 
currency should have depreciated abruptly in March 1780" (p. 685)." Finding no abrupt 
depreciation in the data for April of 1780, he argues that the fiscal backing theory fails. 
Michener does not mention the large depreciation (from 45.25 continentals per specie 
dollar to 61.50) for the average value in February to that of March 1780. According to 
the backing view, the timing of exchange rate changes should correspond to the timing 
of the news of Congress' intent. Thus my description, and Gouverneur Morris's, are 
fully consistent with the large depreciation that occurred immediately prior to the 
enactment of the Forty-for-one Act. 
The version of my exchange-rate model which Michener claims to "test" and reject 
is a straw man which I did not propose. In the appendix to my article, I began with the 
simplest model of money demand in which government-supplied paper had no substi- 
tutes and derived the implication that the level of real money balances is inversely 
related to expected inflation, holding income, wealth, and real interest rates constant. 
Michener adopts this model and rejects the fiscal backing view based on the lack of 
correlation between real balances of continentals and actual rates of inflation. 
Michener's test is flawed for several reasons: First, the initial heuristic model was 
qualified in an important respect which Michener ignores. I stated explicitly that the 
availability of substitutes for continentals would not change the basic result of the model 
(the link between fiscal news and the exchange rate) but would dampen and perhaps 
eliminate the supposed correlation between real balances and expected inflation: 
A novel feature of this case is that total real money balances . .. are bounded from below by the 
zero-inflation level of money demand. Government liquidity rent (or seignorage) is limited due to 
the availability of an elastically supplied . .. substitute . .. which maintains its real value in specie 
terms (p. 67). 
Here I point out that the existence of substitutes like coin, state-issued paper, or trade 
credit, may place an upper bound on equilibrium expected inflation. This is perfectly 
compatible with viewing actual inflation as mainly unanticipated changes in the price 
level due to fiscal news. In this case real continental balances and expected inflation may 
be uncorrelated. 
A second problem of Michener's test is that variation in income, wealth, and real 
interest rates is not accounted for. If these variables are correlated with changes in 
inflation or money issues, then Michener's results will be biased. Finally, actual inflation 
is a poor indicator of expected inflation in an environment in which unanticipated fiscal 
news is an important determinant of the exchange rate and price level. 
QUESTIONS OF LOGIC 
The claim that the quantity theory can offer a substitute explanation for the 
fiscal-backing view of continental depreciation is simply fallacious. To see this, consider 
4See John Catanzariti and E. James Ferguson, eds., The Papers of Robert Morris (Pittsburgh, 
1984), vol. 4, pp. 353-54. 
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a simple money-demand function in which the aggregate level of real balances is 
constant (equal to X in commodity units), and in which money consists of the 
components Michener suggests: continentals (C), specie (S), state issues (I), and book 
credit (B). The assumption of a constant level of real money balances enables one to 
make the argument a fortiori, and amounts to abstracting from changes in income and 
wealth effects in money demand. 
Define e, and ej as exchange prices, denominated in specie, of continentals and state 
currency issues respectively. Book credit, indexed to inflation, is assumed to be 
denominated effectively in units of specie. Define a commodity price index, denomi- 
nated in specie, as ep. This strict version of the quantity theory yields the following 
expression: 
epX = eC + ej1 + S + B. 
This condition is not sufficient to determine ej or e,. To demonstrate this argument a 
fortiori, assume that ep is primarily determined by international price parity or given 
domestic commodity and specie supplies, and that I and C are given by exogenous 
policy. There remain an infinite number of combinations of e, and ej which satisfy this 
equation. In fact, there would still exist an infinite number of equilibrium combinations 
of the two exchange rates even if S and B both were assumed to be pre-determined for 
all time. Of course, the supplies of specie and book credit were not set exogenously; 
rather, they rose and fell (when not otherwise constrained) to offset movements in the 
real supply of their close substitute, paper currency. 
Fiscal (redemption) expectations tie down the time paths for e, and ej, and explain the 
movements over time in the relative prices of continentals, state note issues, and specie, 
as I described in my article. Absent additional constraints like these, it is not possible 
to explain exchange rates among monies or long-run specie flows. The assumptions of 
substitutability among monies and an aggregate quantity theory of money demand 
simply cannot provide explanations for the changing exchange values of the continental 
or the state issues, or for the changing composition of real balances. 
Michener does not address the problem of relative price determination among monies. 
He does erroneously suggest, in one curious passage, that Congress (or someone) 
initially maintained exchange-rate parity for the continental.5 He occasionally invokes 
Gresham's Law to eliminate one or another premium medium of exchange from the 
aggregate money-demand function. This, of course, already presumes a mechanism for 
determining relative currency prices, which Michener's story lacks. Moreover, it 
presumes that currencies that become less used for trading are not potentially useful for 
5It is hard to imagine what Michener has in mind when he writes: "continental currency initially 
circulated at par with specie. As issues multiplied in 1775/76, specie disappeared from circulation. 
With the displacement of specie, the par of exchange could no longer be maintained, and the 
continental began to float against other currencies (p. 683)." When a government pegs the 
exchange rate between its currency and specie by promising convertibility upon demand, then 
depletions of the government's supply of specie can, as this passage suggests, make it impossible 
to maintain parity. The Continental Congress, however, never pegged continental-specie xchange 
rates in this way, and never hoarded specie to ensure future convertibility. Thus, there was no 
connection between specie flows out of the country and government backing of the currency. It is 
beyond the scope of this reply to challenge more generally Michener's "customary fixed-exchange- 
rate" view of colonial currency valuation. See Bruce D. Smith, "Money and Inflation in the 
American Colonies: Further Evidence on the Failure of the Quantity Theory" (unpublished 
manuscript, University of Western Ontario, 1987); and fn. 38 of my article. Parities in tax collection 
between paper currency, on the one hand, and specie or commodities, on the other hand, in some 
cases acted to "fix" exchange rates, though this is not the mechanism which Michener imagines. 
Examples of the operation of this mechanism are available upon request. 
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trading and should not be included in the definition of money. Before continentals were 
issued, specie and colonial bills performed dual functions as stores of value and media 
of exchange. With the onset of war, specie and colonial bills became the superior stores 
of value (they were more immune to the changing fortunes of the Revolutionary War), 
while continentals became a more convenient medium of exchange (probably because 
prices were usually quoted in continentals and their use avoided haggling over a rate of 
exchange). Commodity transactions continued to occur in both continentals and specie, 
and individuals exchanged one medium for the other as well (hence, the data on 
exchange rates). To suggest that premium currencies should be excluded from the 
measure of the money supply is to neglect the store-of-value function which specie had 
served before the War, and to underestimate the transactability of specie during the 
War. Finally, Michener's advocacy of Gresham's Law is not consistent. Sometimes 
(when it suits his purpose as quantity-theory advocate) he includes multiple currencies 
trading at varying exchange rates in his definition of the money supply. To summarize, 
Michener fails to provide an explanation for which media depreciate in relative terms, 
or for the conditions under which a premium currency will be driven from circulation, 
and neglects the store-of-value function of money in his treatment of money demand.6 
Michener's discussion of the new-tenor note issues and other increases in federal debt 
in 1780 and 1781, which coincided with continental depreciation, only provides further 
evidence of the importance of fiscal backing. For a given level of expected real tax 
resources, an increase in federal debt will make currency redemption less likely. This is 
especially true if, as I argued (p. 64), it made sense for the public to anticipate that these 
debt issues would be favored over currency by future redemption policy. It is important 
to note that while the continental suffered continued depreciation in the face of these 
federal debt issues, Pennsylvania currency retained its specie value, as I showed in my 
article. This change in relative paper currency prices is fully consistent with the 
tax-backing view and not explicable by appeal to the quantity theory. 
QUESTIONS OF MEASUREMENT 
Although the question of the definition and time path of aggregate real money 
balances is tangential to the question of exchange-rate determination, Michener's 
description warrants some discussion. His selective inclusion of state issues (excluded 
in 1776 but included in 1780), interest-bearing notes (excluded when issued by states, 
included when issued by the Congress in the form of new-tenor notes and certificates in 
1780/81), specie (excluded in 1776, and included in 1780), and book credit (included as 
needed to counter movements in the remaining components of money) is very selective 
indeed. His discussion seems designed to answer the question: "If one wanted to 
believe that aggregate real money balances had never changed, what else would one 
need to believe." Thus he is not concerned by the lack of data on new-tenor emissions 
or state-issue exchange rates; his goal is simply to show that one can believe in the 
6 History is full of examples which contradict Gresham's supposed "law." Currencies often have 
circulated at a premium alongside those of lesser market value and equal face value. See Angela 
Redish, "Why Was Specie Scarce in Colonial Economies? An Analysis of the Canadian Currency, 
1796-1830," this JOURNAL, 44 (Sept. 1984), p. 718; Arthur J. Rolnick and Warren E. Weber, 
"Gresham's Law or Gresham's Fallacy?," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (Feb. 1986), pp. 
185-99; David Martin, "The Changing Role of Foreign Money in the United States, 1782-1857," 
this JOURNAL, 37 (Dec. 1977), pp. 1009-27; and Charles W. Calomiris, "Explaining Gresham's 
Law" (unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University, 1986). Michener argues that legal tender 
laws may have driven specie from circulation, but available evidence indicates that price controls 
were not enforced. See Albert Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 1774-1789 (New 
York, 1883), pp. 158-89. Furthermore, continentals were driven out of circulation by mid-1781, a 
clear contradiction of Gresham's Law. 
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constancy of real money balances if one is willing to be flexible about the definition of 
money. What a surprise. 
At the same time, Michener's discussion of the increased demand for money and 
reduced usefulness of book credit during the War is well taken, and no doubt explains 
some of the increase in real money stock. His two-month lag correction for exchange 
rates prior to 1780, and his revision of continental money issues in 1779 are also well 
taken, though they are of little consequence for the time path of real continental money 
balances. 
Michener's use of Bezanson's price index to deflate nominal continentals is more 
suspect. I was interested in measuring the changing expectations of specie (that is, tax) 
redemption, hence my use of specie exchange rates rather than commodity prices. The 
use of a commodity price index is generally more appropriate for Michener's purpose 
(estimating aggregate real money demand) under standard assumptions. But commodity 
price parity across the colonies may have been poor relative to specie price parity, 
because of relative ease of specie transport. Thus the exchange rate series may be a 
better indicator of national prices than the commodity price index in Philadelphia. 
CONCLUSION 
Economic theory can illuminate history or obscure it depending on the motivations 
which give rise to the application of theory. If history is used as a wheel on which to 
grind time-invariant propositions like the quantity theory, and if evidence is used and 
sources are interpreted selectively to support such propositions, little will be learned. 
Economists can further historical understanding most by bringing tools rather than 
conclusions to the arena of historical debate. 
